Davis v. United States: A Victory for Congressional Intent in the Federal Income Laws by Kemper, James D.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 46 | Issue 1 Article 6
Fall 1970
Davis v. United States: A Victory for Congressional
Intent in the Federal Income Laws
James D. Kemper
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kemper, James D. (1970) "Davis v. United States: A Victory for Congressional Intent in the Federal Income Laws," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 46 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol46/iss1/6
NOTES
DAVIS v. UNITED STATES: A VICTORY FOR CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS
The Supreme Court in Davis v. United States' held that the
existence of a bona fide business purpose for a stock redemption was
irrelevant in determining dividend equivalency under section 302(b) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; such a redemption to a corpora-
tion's sole shareholder was always to be deemed essentially equivalent
to a dividend for federal income tax purposes. The basic question from
Davis is whether this holding emasculates section 302(b) (1), or merely
reasserts the true import of the section as enacted by Congress in 1954.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in section 301(a)
and (c) 2 that a distribution of property by a corporation to a share-
holder with respect to its stock is includable in the shareholder's gross
income, if the distribution is a dividend, as defined in section 316.'
The term "dividend" is defined in section 316(a) as any distribution
of property by a corporation to its shareholders out of the corporation's
earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913. In addition,
1. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
2. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 301:
(a) IN GENERAI-Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a dis-
tribution of property (as defined in section 317(a)) made by a corporation
to a shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner
provided in subsection (c) ..
(c) AMOUNT TAXABLE.-In the case of a distribution to which subsection
(a) applies-
(1) AMOUNT CONSTITUTING DIVIDEND.-That portion of the distribution
which is a dividend (as defined in section 316) shall be included- in gross
income.
(2) AMOUNT APPLIED AGAINST BASIS.-That portion of the distribution
which is not a dividend shall be applied against and reduce the adjusted
basis of the stock.
(3) AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF BASIS.-
(A) IN GENERAL.- . . . that portion of the distribution which is
not a dividend, to the extent it exceeds the adjusted basis of the stock, shall
be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property ....
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 316:
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dividend"
means any distribution of property made by a corporation to its share-
holders-
(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1913 . . . . Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every distribution
is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof . ...
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section 316(a) sets forth the rule that every distribution by a corpora-
tion is deemed to be out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof.
Therefore, whenever a corporation, which has either current or accumu-
lated earnings and profits, makes a distribution of property to its share-
holders, the distribution is considered a dividend and is taxable as ordinary
income. One exception to this treatment of corporate distributions is
found in section 302(b) (1)' which provides that if a corporation
redeems its stock and "the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend," then the transaction is treated as a sale or exchange of the
redeemed stock. If the redeemed stock has been held longer than six
months by the shareholder, any gain on the transaction is a capital gain.
Thus, the determination of whether a corporate distribution to a share-
holder in return for stock shall be subject to treatment as a capital gain
is dependent upon a finding that the distribution was "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend."
The federal circuit courts of appeals have differed in their approach
in the development of a test to determine when a stock redemption is not
a dividend under the vague rule in section 302(b) (1). Basically, the
split concerned whether a legitimate corporate business purpose was
relevant in determining dividend equivalency under section 302(b) (1).
The first approach, which has been characterized as the "net effect" test,
stated that any business purpose was irrelevant, and the basic question
focused upon the net effects of the redemption on the shareholder's stock
ownership rights. If there has been no effect on the shareholder's rights
to vote or control the corporation, to participate in future distributions
of current or accumulated earnings, or to share in the net assets of the
corporation upon liquidation, then the redemption is "essentially
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning
of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1) . . . of subsection (b) applies,
such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment
in exchange for the stock.
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.
(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIVIDENDS.- Subsection (a) shall
apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend ....
(d) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY.- . . . if a
corporation redeems its stock .... and if subsection (a) of this section does not
apply, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution of property to which
section 301 applies.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 317(b):
(b) REDEMPTION OF STOCK.-For purposes of this part, stock shall be
treated as redeemed by a corporation if the corporation acquires its stock
from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether or not the stock so
acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treasury stock.
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equivalent to a dividend."5 The second approach, which has been
characterized as the "flexible net effect" test, deemed the "net effect"
test as a factor to be weighted, but considered a valid business purpose
for the redemption as sufficient to overcome its resemblance to a dividend
under the "net effect" test.6
To understand how the circuit courts' interpretation of the phrase
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" came to be so divergent and
confusing that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals called it a "morass, ' "
a discussion of the legislative and judicial history of the phrase is
necessary.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SECTION 302(b) (1)
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. Ma-
comber,8 which held that stock dividends are not taxable income,
Congress enacted section 201 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921.' This
5. The Second Circuit has been the only circuit to hold that a business purpose
is not important in any case involving § 302(b) (1) and to follow strictly the analysis
that looks only to the net effects on the incidents of ownership that result from the
redemption. See Himmel v. Comm'r, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964); McGinty v.
Comm'r, 325 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Levin v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.
1967); Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965); Northup v. United
States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957); Kirschenbaum v. Comm'r, 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.
1946).
The First Circuit has gone so far as to say that where the taxpayer is the sole
or dominant shareholder of the distributing corporation a business purpose is irrelevant.
See Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1967); Friend v. United
States, 345 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1965) ; Bradbury v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.
1962) ; United States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1962).
The Third Circuit also has said that the terms "essentially equivalent to a dividend"
were aimed at results or effects rather than purpose. See Kessner v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d
943 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Boyle v. Comi'r, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 817 (1951) ; Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1941).
6. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits at least give
some weight to a business purpose for the redemption. See Ballenger v. United States,
301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958) ;
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Commissioner v. Brown, 69
F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 570 (1934); Heman v. Comm'r, 283
F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960); Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966);
Philps v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1957); Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v.
Comm'r, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337
(10th Cir. 1966); Sorem v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964); Jones v. Griffin,
216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954).
7. Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
8. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
9. REv. Acr of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228:
(d) A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the dis-
tribution of any such dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem
its stock at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and
cancellation or redemption essentially equivalent to the distribution of a
taxable dividend, the amount received in redemption or cancellation of the
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section provided that stock dividends were not subject to taxation;
however, if they were later redeemed by the corporation "at such time
and in such manner as to make" the redemption "essentially equivalent
to the distribution of a taxable dividend," then, to the extent of corporate
earnings and profits, the distribution was to be taxed as a dividend. The
purpose of section 201 (d) was to prevent corporations from issuing
stock dividends and later redeeming this stock for cash which, if taxable
at all,'" would be treated as a capital gain.'1
It was discovered that the same tax avoidance could be accomplished
whether the stock dividend was declared before or after the redemption."
To remedy this, Congress amended the section in 1926 to include re-
demptions or cancellations which meet the dividend equivalency test
whether or not the stock was originally issued as a stock dividend.'"
Thus, the phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend" was initially
aimed only at preventing tax avoidance. This is emphasized by the fact
that section 201 (g)' 4 used the terms "at such time and in such manner"
which would imply that if a corporation redeemed its stock for a valid
business purpose and not at the time and in the manner of a normal
dividend, then the redemption would not be "essentially equivalent to a
taxable dividend." The showing of a business purpose for the redemption
would dispell any impression of tax avoidance and make the redemption
not "at such time and in such manner" as to be "essentially equivalent
stock shall be treated as a taxable dividend to the extent of the earnings or
profits accumulated by such corporation after February 28, 1913.
10. A taxpayer could escape taxation entirely. For example, a corporation could
declare a 100 per cent stock dividend on stock that had a basis to the shareholder
(taxpayer) of 100 dollars per share. After the stock dividend, the shareholder would
have twice as many shares. Hence, a proportionate allocation of his basis would give
him a basis of 50 dollars per share. If the corporation redeemed part of this stock at a
price equal to its basis (50 dollars), the shareholder would have no gain on the
transaction and, thus, not be subject to any tax.
11. See Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F.2d 602, 603 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 570 (1934).
12. H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1926). For example, a corpora-
tion could redeem part of its stock and then later declare a stock dividend in order to
replenish the shareholder's supply of stock for future redemptions. The end result
would be the same type of tax avoidance § 201 (d) of the REv. AcT of 1921 had tried to
prevent,
13. REv. AcT of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 11.
14. (g) If a coiporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not
such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner
as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part
essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend the amount so
distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that
it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February
28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend.
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to a taxable dividend." Indeed, this is how the courts originally inter-
preted section 201(g). In Commissioner v. Brown," the court held that
the government must show some circumstance in time or manner indicat-
ing that the redemption was essentially equivalent to a dividend, and that
a cash redemption per se did not come under the dividend equivalency
test of section 201 (g)." With that as the test, the showing of a business
purpose for the redemption became highly persuasive in dispelling both
indications of tax avoidance and circumstances in time or manner which
made the redemption appear essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend.'
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939, in section 115(g)'" reiterated
the dividend equivalency test substantially as it had been in section
201 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1926. However, in 1940 Associate Justice
Vinson in Flanigan v. Helvering" said that the net effect of the dis-
tribution rather than the motives of the taxpayer or his corporation is the
fundamental question in administering section l15(g).' The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Smith v. United States," cites Flanigan
as the originator of the "net effect" test" and further holds that section
l15(g) of the 1939 Code and section 201(g) of the 1926 Act were
aimed at the results of the redemption, not the purpose. In support of
this interpretation, the Smith court cites a congressional report." This
report stated that section 201 (g) of the House bill amended the pro-
vision of the existing law in order to make clear that a corporation,
especially one with only a few shareholders, will not be able to use a
redemption, even without resorting to the device of a stock dividend,
to get capital gains treatment, when the redemption would have the
same effect as a taxable dividend." The Second and Third Circuit
Courts of Appeals were the only courts to clearly adopt the "net effect"
15. 69 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 570 (1934).
16. 69 F.2d at 604.
17. See Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935).
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48:
(g) REDEMPTION OF STocic.-If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock
(whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at such time
and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemp-
tion in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the
stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits
accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend.
19. 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
20. Id. at 939-40.
21. 121 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1941).
22. Id. at 695.
23. H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1926).
24. Id.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
test.25 The remaining circuits, to varying degrees, continued to hold that
a business purpose was relevant. 6
In an attempt to resolve these conflicting interpretations, the House
of Representatives in 1954 proposed a section that established objective
tests to determine when a redemption would be excepted from taxation
as a dividend and excluded the "essentially equivalent to a dividend"
language." The Senate Finance Committee found the House's section
too restrictive and stated:
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under
which stock may be redeemed at capital gains rates, these rules
appeared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case of
redemption of preferred stock which might be called by the
corporation without the shareholder having any control when
the redemption may take place. Accordingly your committee
follows existing law by reinserting the general language indicat-
ing that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part
or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend."
Hence, section 302(b) (1) as enacted in 1954, contained the vague
phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend" with which the courts
had been struggling for 33 years. The court in Ballenger v. United
States29 asserted that the law in this area would have been clarified had
not this vague, negative test been included in the 1954 Code.
A DISCUSSION OF THE DAVIS CASE
In United States v. Davis"0 the taxpayer and another individual,
25. See Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Kirschenbaum v.
Comm'r, 155 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1946). The Supreme Court, foreshadowing its holding
in Davis, adopted the "net effect" test in construing § 112(c) (2) of the INT. REV.
CODE of 1939 which was quite similar to § 115(g) of the INT. REV. CODE Of 1939.
26. See cases cited note 6 supra.
27. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954). The objective tests
mentioned above were essentially what is now contained in INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 302(b) (2) and (3). Section 302(b) (2) provides that a substantially disproportionate
redemption, as determined by a precise mathematical formula, will not be subject to
taxation as a dividend under § 301. Section 302(b) (3) provides that § 301 shall not
apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder.
28. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1954). B. BITrKER and J.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 291
(2d ed. 1966), assert that it is not easy to give § 302(b) (1) an expansive construction
in view of this indication that its major function was the narrow one of immunizing
redemptions of minority holdings of preferred stock.
29. 301 F.2d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 1962).
30. 397 U.S. 301 (1970). [hereinafter cited as Davis].
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Mr. Bradley, had organized a corporation with the taxpayer and his
wife each owning 250 shares of common stock and Bradley 500 shares.
Thereafter, the taxpayer purchased 1,000 shares of preferred stock in
the corporation at 25 dollars per share in order to increase the corpora-
tion's working capital and thereby qualify for a loan from the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation. It was understood that the corporation
was to redeem the preferred stock upon repayment of the RFC loan. Sub-
sequently, the taxpayer bought Bradley's 500 shares of common stock
and distributed it equally between his son and daughter. After repayment
of the RFC loan, the corporation, in accordance with the original agree-
ment, redeemed the taxpayer's preferred stock for 25,000 dollars: its
original cost to taxpayer. At the time of the redemption, the taxpayer
owned 250 shares of common stock and 1,000 shares of preferred stock;
his wife, son, and daughter each owned 250 shares of common stock.
There were no other shareholders in the corporation.
The taxpayer argued that the redemption was the culmination of
the original plan to qualify for the RFC loan and thus, a legitimate
business purpose existed to make the redemption "not essentially equi-
valent to a dividend." The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed,
contending that this redemption had the same net effect as a dividend
since it did not cause any decrease in the taxpayer's ownership rights in
the corporation. The United States District Court held that a legitimate
business purpose for the redemption of the taxpayer's preferred stock
made the redemption eligible for treatment as "not essentially equivalent
to a dividend" under section 302(b) (1)." The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed." The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
resolve the conflict in the circuit courts over whether a valid business
purpose for a redemption by a closely held corporation qualifies the
redemption for section 302 (b) (1) treatment.
One factor playing an important role in the Supreme Court's final
resoluton of Davis was its holding that for the purposes of analysis
under section 302(b) (1) the attribution rules of section 318(a)"4
31. 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
32. 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
33. 396 U.S. 815 (1969).
34. IrnT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 318(a):
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-For purposes of those provisions of this subchapter
to which the rules contained in this section are expressly made applicable-
(1) MEMBERS OF FAMILY.-
(A) I GENERAL.-An individual shall be considered as owning the
stock owned, directly, or indirectly, by or for-
(i) his spouse . . . and
(ii) his children . ...
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apply, and therefore, the taxpayer was constructively the sole shareholder
of the corporation. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and
held a business purpose to be irrelevant in determining dividend equi-
valency under section 302(b) (1). The Court further concluded that a
redemption by a closely held corporation was always "essentially equi-
valent to a dividend.""5 In reaching this result, the Court quoted
extensively from the Senate Finance Committee's report on section
302(b) (1). In explaining the addition of the terms "essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend," the Senate Finance Committee announced that the
test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of section 302 (b) (1)
was the one currently employed under section l15(g) of the 1939
Code."6 As noted earlier, the test as applied by the circuit courts was in
a state of considerable confusion because the courts did not agree as to
whether or not a business purpose was relevant. In light of this, the
Finance Committee, in an attempt to clarify their conception of the
correct test, asserted:
Your committee further intends that in applying this test
for the future that the inquiry will be devoted solely to the
question whether or not the transaction by its nature may
properly be characterized as a sale of stock by the redeeming
shareholder to the corporation. For this purpose the presence
or absence of earnings or profits of the corporation is not
material."
The Supreme Court recognized that the legislative history was cer-
tainly not free from doubt, but concluded that Congress, by making the
sole inquiry the narrow one of whether or not the redemption could be
characterized as a sale, was apparently rejecting past court decisions
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(c) :
(C) CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.-
(1) IN GENERAL-Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this sub-
section, section 318(a) shall apply in determining the ownership of stock
for purposes of his section.
The taxpayer in Davis argued that, since only §§ 302(b)(2) and 302(b)(3)
expressly mentioned ownership of stock and 302(c) only made 318(a) expressly
applicable in determining ownership of stock, the 318(a) rules of attribution did not
apply to 302(b) (1). The Supreme Court said that the plain language of the statute
compels rejection of the taxpayer's argument. 397 U.S. at 307. The Court held that
318(a) applies to § 302 whenever ownership of stock is relevant. See Thomas G.
Lewis, 35 T.C. 71 (1960) ; Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962);
Himmel v. Comm'r, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964); Levin v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 521 (2d
Cir. 1967) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960) ; B. BITTKER and J. EusTIcE, supra note 28,
at 291 n.32.
35. 397 U.S. at 307.
36. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
37. Id. at 44-45.
DAVIS v. UNITED STATES
holding factors indicating tax avoidance to be relevant. 8
The Court's conclusion was further supported" by the Finance
Committee's explanation of why they separated redemptions and partial
liquidations into two parts. The Finance Committee announced:
Those distributions which may have capital gains char-
acteristics because they are not made pro rata among the
various shareholders would be subjected, at the shareholders
level, to the separate tests described in part I of this subchapter
[sections 301-18]. On the other hand those distributions
characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level...,
would be included as within the aspect of a partial liquidation
[section 3461.0
It seems clear from the Finance Committee's announcement that section
302 was meant to deal with non-pro rata distributions,4' and that the
test to be applied would concern the effects of the distribution at the
shareholder level. Moreover, any corporate justification was to be con-
sidered as immaterial for purposes of sections 301-18.1' Indeed, this is
how the Treasury Regulations have interpreted section 302 from its
inception."' The Supreme Court said that since Congress, under section
301 and 316, treated any distribution by a corporation which has
earnings and profits as a taxable dividend, it was clearly proper for
Congress to tax any redemption which did not meet the specific "safe
harbors" of section 302 as dividends without regard to corporate moti-
vation in order to prevent tax avoidance.44 Therefore, the Supreme Court
concluded that, since the taxpayer in Davis was constructively the sole
38. 397 U.S. at 311.
39. Id. at 311-12 n. 11.
40. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
41. See Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations,
44 CORNELL L.Q. 299, 325 (1959).
42. This is further supported by the Finance Committee's statements regarding
the correct test under § 346 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954. Section 346 provides,
inter alia, that a distribution is a partial liquidation, if the distribution is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend, is in redemption bf a part of the stock of the corporation
pursuant to a plan, and occurs within the taxable year in which the plan is adopted.
The Finance Committee stated that a valid business purpose for the partial liquidation
would qualify the distribution under § 346 and cited Jospeh W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836
(1948), as an example of a valid business purpose case. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 44 (1954). Since Congress was aware of the business purpose doctrine and
endorsed it as it related to § 346, it would seem that their failure to mention or endorse
it in discussing § 302(b) (1) would lend weight to the argument that it was not meant
to be incorporated in that section.
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-1(b), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 61, 73; see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) and (b) (1960).
44. 397 U.S. at 313.
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shareholder of the corporation, the distribution of 25,000 dollars in
redemption of his preferred stock was pro rata and resulted in no mean-
ingful reduction in his proportionate interest in the corporation. As a
result, the distribution was "essentially equivalent to a dividend" and,
by virtue of section 302(d), was treated as a distribution under section
301. Thus, it was includable in the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
as a taxable dividend by sections 301 (c) and 316.4"
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, claiming that the bona
fide business purpose for the redemption prevented characterization of the
payment as a dividend." They added that when the Court held this to
be a dividend it was effectively cancelling section 302(b) (1) from the
Code.48 This clearly is an overstatement by the dissent, since any
redemption that meets the Davis test of a meaningful reduction in the
taxpayer's ownership rights, will still qualify under section 302 (b) (1) ."
The dissent is correct, however, to the extent it implies that Davis
effectively prevents section 302(b) (1) from applying to stock redemp-
tions to the sole shareholder of a corporation.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DAVIS DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision in the Davis case will bring greater
predictability and clarity to an area of the tax law which has plagued
Congress, the courts, and the Internal Revenue Service since the intro-
duction of the vague phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend" in the
Code. But the Supreme Court, by focusing upon whether or not a
business purpose was relevant and by assuming that a redemption having
the same effect as a dividend is necessarily "essentially equivalent to a
dividend,""0 failed to face the central issue of dividend equivalency:
under what circumstances may a redemption properly be characterized
as a sale of stock?1 The problem in the area of stock redemptions
results from the fact that Congress has seen fit, generally, to tax only the
earnings and profits of a domestic corporation upon their distribution to
45. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(d), quoted in note 4 supra. Section 302(d)
provides, inter alia, that if a redemption is found to be essentially equivalent to a
dividend under § 302(b)(1), § 301 is to apply. Hence, even if the redemption is
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" under § 302(b)(1), it will only be taxed as a
dividend if the redeeming corporation has accumulated earnings or profits. See INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 301 and 316, quoted in notes 2 and 3 supra.
46. 397 U.S. at 313.
47. Id. at 313-14.
48. Id. at 314.
49. See examples given in note 57 infra. Cf. Note, Tax is 'Not Essentially Eqii-
valent to a Dividend' Still There? 22 BAY. L. REv. 429 (1970).
50. 397 U.S. at 313.
51. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
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the shareholder, and not when earned. 2 The result is that corporations,
to an extent, are permitted to accumulate earnings and profits which are
not taxed as income until distributed, if ever, to the owners. Therefore,
the basic problem facing Congress in 1954 was how to prevent cor-
porations from distributing these accumulated earnings and profits in
the form of a stock redemption, without subjecting a redemption to
taxation as ordinary income when the shareholder could have sold his
stock to a disinterested third party. Congress, in enacting section 302 (b)
(1), said that the test was whether the redemption could properly be
characterized as a sale. 3 The Supreme Court failed to analyze in the
Davis case whether there was any change in the incidents of ownership
in the corporation resulting from the redemption of the taxpayer's
preferred stock. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Himmel v.
Commissioner" found that the ownership of stock involved the right to
vote, the right to share in the net assets upon liquidation of the cor-
poration, and the right to participate in current profits and accumulated
surplus. Of course, since the taxpayer in Davis was constructively the
sole owner of the corporation, none of these rights were affected by the
redemption of his stock. However, the Supreme Court by stating that to
qualify for preferred treatment under section 302(b) (1) a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate
interests in the corporation," without enumerating what were the relevant
interests, left unclear what would be the proper treatment of cases in the
future involving a number of stockholders holding different classes of
stock in various proportions and situations where the redemption is not
pro rata.
Even accepting the Supreme Court's conclusions that a business
purpose is irrelevant, and the redemption resulted in no meaningful
effect on the taxpayer's ownership interests, there are at least three
analogous transactions which may cast doubt on the Court's holding
that this redemption was "essentially equivalent to a dividend." First,
52. Compare this treatment of domestic corporate distributions with that in
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 551 and 951. Under certain circumstances, these sections
tax the earnings and profits of a foreign corporation as dividends to the United States
shareholder whether or not the corporation distributes these earnings and profits to the
shareholder.
53. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954). As stated in Bradbury v.
Comm'r, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 1962): "Those transactions [when a corporation
acquires its own stock] which more closely resemble sales are accorded capital gains
treatment while those partaking of the essential attributes of a dividend-however
styled-are taxable at ordinary income rates."
54. 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
55. 397 U.S. at 313.
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the taxpayer's purchase of preferred stock coupled with an agreement
from the corporation to redeem it when the RFC loan was repaid, is
similar to a subordinated loan from the taxpayer to the corporation.
The difficulty with this characterization of the Davis situation is that, in
light of the fact that the RFC would not have given the corporation a
loan until more capital had been contributed, the Davis corporation was
probably too thinly capitalized to permit the Court to reconstruct the
transaction as a subordinated loan.5" There is even less reason to re-cast
the transaction as a debt after the taxpayer purchased Bradley's 500
shares since he was then constructively the sole shareholder. Second, the
transaction in Davis is similiar to the sale by the taxpayer of his preferred
stock to a disinterested third party; but, the sale to a disinterested third
party would have resulted in a decrease in the taxpayer's incidents of
stock ownership which did not occur in Davis. Third, the transaction
was in some respects similar to a redemption prior to the taxpayer's
purchase of Bradley's shares. But this analogy is destroyed because such
a redemption would not have been pro rata and would have resulted in
a decrease in the taxpayer's incidents of stock ownership, unlike the
Davis transaction.
The dissimilarities in each of these analogous transactions should
preclude any assertion that the Supreme Court placed a premium on
form over substance by not characterizing the Davis transaction as one
of the above. Even though the Supreme Court looked at the substance
of the transaction, by focusing on the lack of relevance of a business
purpose and failing to articulate what it was that distinguished Davis
from these types of analogous transactions, it failed to face the basic issue
under section 302(b) (1): what prevented the Davis redemption from
properly being characterized as a sale.
Congress, by making the sole inquiry under section 302(b) (1)
whether or not the redemption could properly be characterized as a sale
and omitting the terms "at such time and in such manner," gave notice
that section 302(b) (1) was no longer solely concerned with preventing
tax avoidance schemes. The phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend"
was no longer merely meant to prevent tax avoidance. In addition, it was
meant to prevent unfairness in a situation where a shareholder's stock was
redeemed (which, without section 302(b) (1), would be taxed as a
56. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Comm'r, 318 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1963),
which held that advances by a controlling corporation to its thinly capitalized sub-
sidiary were contributions to capital and not loans for federal income tax purposes.
Bu t cf. Edwards v. Comm'r, 415 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1969). See also INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 385.
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dividend by section 301), when he could have sold the stock to a dis-
interested third party. Thus, the dissent in Davis is correct in saying that
the majority effectively cancelled section 302(b) (1) from the Code, at
least in cases involving closely held corporations. However, by doing so
the majority was merely correcting an error in the interpretation of
section 302(b) (1) that had developed in the circuit courts. The re-
demption of stock by a closely held corporation is not like the sale of the
same stock to disinterested third parties. In a transaction involving a
closely held corporation and a pro rata redemption, the shareholders
relinquish no rights to current or accumulated earnings, they relinquish
no rights to assets upon liquidation, and they relinquish no control over
the corporation. Therefore, such a transaction was never intended by
Congress to come under the exception in section 302(b) (1) to section
301.
Clearly, the scope of section 302(b) (1) has been narrowed by the
Davis case, but it is not cancelled. For example, a redemption that is not
pro rata and results in a significant decrease in the shareholder's right to
current earnings and accumulated surplus, right to control the corpora-
tion, or right to the assets of the corporation on liquidation should still
be exempted from dividend treatment by section 302(b) (1) under the
Davis interpretation.57
It can be concluded from the Supreme Court's holding in Davis
and its previous ruling in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford 8 that, in
cases involving dividend equivalency, the existence of a legitimate
corporate business purpose for the transaction will not determine the
resolution of the problem. Also, for purposes of section 302(b)(1),
the redemption of a sole shareholder's stock will always be deemed
"essentially equivalent to a dividend." Hence, the Davis case will bring
greater predictability and security in terms of tax planning in the area of
57. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 161;
and Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 Cum. Bu.L. 221 would seem to meet the Davis test and
still be valid examples of the scope of § 302(b)(1). A redemption involving more
than one class of stock not held proportionately by the same shareholders resulting in a
distribution that would be different from a dividend might still come under § 302
(b) (1), especially if the shareholder's interests in the corporation were substantially
changed. See Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957). Even a pro rata
corporation might come under the Davis rationale. See Rev. Rul. 56-485, 1956-2
Cum. BuLL. 176 which held that a pro rata redemption by a corporation of 20 per cent
of its preferred stock, where the preferred was not owned by those shareholders in
substantially the same proportion as they owned common stock (resulting in a decrease
of their ownership interests), was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. See also
Rev. Rul. 56-540, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 177. Cf. 22 BAY. L. REV. 429 (1970).
58. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
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section 302(b) (I) stock redemptions than has been possible since Con-
gress first introduced the vague phrase "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" 59 years ago.
JAMES D. KEmPER
